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ABSTRACT 
Coordinating the cumulative use of distributed resources in a grid 
environment so that users do not consume too much is a difficult 
task. This paper presents one approach that we have implemented 
in Globus Toolkit version 4 (GT4), that uses an SQL database to 
hold “coordination” data, and policy decision points (PDPs) to 
make access control decisions about whether the user’s request 
for more resources can be granted or denied. When access is 
granted, obligations in the policy ensure that the coordination 
database is appropriately updated. In our initial implementation, 
the coordination service is imbedded into the GT4 authorization 
chain as a custom PDP so that any web service can be provided 
with a security policy that provides a coordination capability.  In 
the final section we describe how coordinated decision making 
could be more tightly integrated into a future version of GT. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
D.4.6 Security and Protection: Access Controls 
C.2.4 Distributed Systems: Distributed applications 
General Terms 
Design, Security, Standardization. 
Keywords 
PDPs, coordinated decision making, policy based access controls, 
grid computing 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Automated Teller Machines (ATMs) have the capability to 
coordinate the withdrawal of money on a daily basis from any 
cash point in the world. This is achieved by standardization of the 
protocols within and between the banks, direct access to the user’s 
account and the transactions that he has made, and the ability to 
write information to the security token (the bank card) that the 
user carries around with him. Providing a similar capability for 
grid jobs, for example, to limit the amount of storage that a user 
may request per day or per job from any storage location on the 
grid, is not so easy. The grid job will almost certainly run on 
different machines under different administrative control, will 
probably run under different account names on each machine, and 
the access control mechanism of one machine is typically unable 
to communicate with those of the other machines. The security 
token that is often passed from machine to machine is the proxy 
certificate [1] but this is not used by the policy decision points 
(PDPs) to communicate with each other, and is not under their 
direct control (unlike the bank card inserted into an ATM). 
Consequently this presents a number of challenges to the designer 
of a policy based coordinated access control system. 
The lack of communication between the PDPs of distributed 
applications can be addressed today by sidestepping the issue and 
using a centralised PDP with a common policy that is used by all 
the grid resources (see Figure 1). Such a system has been 
available for several years to Grid applications that use Globus 
Toolkit (GT) from v3.3 onwards. GT is capable of making an 
external authorization callout using the GGF SAML 
Authorisation protocol specification [3] and several PDPs such as 
the PERMIS authorisation infrastructure [2] have implemented 
this protocol. This sort of access control infrastructure allows a 
common policy to be used by all the resources of a grid but since 
most PDPs today are stateless, they are still unable to coordinate 
their access control decisions across multiple access requests.  A 
further disadvantage of this configuration is that the central PDP 
is a bottleneck to performance because every request needs to be 
diverted to it. 


















Figure 1. Use of a common policy in today’s distributed grid 
applications 
It is far more preferable for each site to have its own PDP under 
its direct control and for the common policy to be distributed to it 
so that the administrator can load it into his PDP. This approach 
will increase the performance of the access control decision 
making, but it still lacks coordination throughout the distributed 
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application. Furthermore, the common policy will contain 
superfluous information for each of the PDPs, since it must cater 
for access requests to all of the resources in the grid.  
To counteract these problems we have taken a multi-pronged 
approach. Firstly, in order to remove the superfluous information 
from each PDP’s policy, we have designed and built a policy 
refinement engine that will decompose a common grid-wide 
policy and create resource specific policies for each resource 
PDP. We do not propose to describe the policy refinement process 
in this paper, but interested readers can consult [4]. Secondly, in 
order to address the coordination problem, the common policy 
(and consequently each refined resource specific policy) contains 
conditions and obligations that allow coordination to take place 
between multiple requests. Conditions are placed on granting 
access to a user’s request that depend upon previous access 
control decisions e.g. a project member is allowed access to 
memory only if less than 20GB memory has already been 
requested. Obligations are then placed on the policy enforcement 
point (PEP) to record the resources that have been authorized for 
consumption. Coordination between the PDPs takes place by 
successively retrieving and updating this state information that is 
stored in an external coordination database.  We chose to 
implement the system by using an external coordination database 
rather than storing the state information in each PDP for several 
reasons. Firstly most of today’s PDPs are stateless, so they will 
not need to be modified in order to support our secure 
coordination service. Secondly, if the state information were 
stored in each PDP, then each PDP would need to communicate 
with every other PDP, which would become increasingly difficult 
to engineer and manage as the number of PDPs grows. Thirdly, 
by making the coordination database a grid service, we get the 
benefits of secure communications between the PEP and the 
service using the existing grid security infrastructure (GSI) [5]. 
Finally, by using database technology we benefit from its 
extensive research into fast and efficient data handling, searching, 
locking, distribution etc.   
 
Figure 2. Coordinated decision making in distributed 
applications 
A simplified picture of our overall design is shown in Figure 2. 
Each PDP loads its own resource specific policy, which may have 
optionally been created by refinement of a common grid wide 
policy. When coordinated access control decisions need to be 
made, each PDP communicates with all the other PDPs in the grid 
via the coordination database, to ensure that all the policy 
conditions are obeyed. This architecture is designed to have 
optimal performance for the decision making, since local 
uncoordinated decisions wont need to interact with the 
coordination database, whilst only coordinated ones will need to. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes 
the coordination policy, with its coordination attributes and 
obligations. Section 3 describes the coordination database grid 
service which holds the coordination data. Section 4 describes the 
coordination aware PDP and how this is currently integrated into 
GT4. Section 5 concludes by looking at the limitations of the 
current research, reviewing related research, and indicating where 
future research is needed. 
2. COORDINATION POLICIES 
In our model, a PDP is considered to be stateless and makes its 
access control decisions against the current policy in isolation to 
all past, present and future access control decisions. The PDP is 
given details (in the form of attributes) about the subject, the 
resource, the requested action and the environment (e.g. current 
time, temperature etc.). This set of attributes is known as the 
request context in the XACML specification [6]. The policy may 
place constraints on any of the request context attributes i.e. on 
the subject (e.g. only subjects who are students), the resource (e.g. 
may only access resources of type printer), the action (e.g. may 
only print a maximum of 10 pages), and the environmental (e.g. 
between 9am and 5pm) attributes. If any access control decision 
will produce state changes in this context and these changes will 
affect future access control decision, then coordination between 
the access control decisions is required. For example, if the policy 
states that students can only print up to 10 pages per day, then if a 
student asks to print 5 pages this will be allowed but the granted 
action must be remembered so that the next time the same student 
makes a request on the same day he will only be allowed to print 
up to 5 pages. This type of constraint on subject, action and/or 
environmental attributes will always require coordination between 
access control decisions, regardless of whether the system has a 
single centralised PDP or multiple distributed PDPs. The use of a 
policy to specify the constraints, and a coordination database to 
hold the request context attributes that need to be coordinated, 
makes the coordination process independent of the number of 
PDPs involved in the grid access control decision making.  
2.1 Coordination Attributes 
In order to store the coordination data we have defined a fifth type 
of request context attribute which we term coordination attributes. 
Coordination attributes are conceptually the same as any other 
type of request context attribute (resource, subject, action or 
environment) but in this case they are attributes of the 
coordination object, rather than the resource, subject, action or 
environment objects. The coordination object is conceptually a 
repository storing the data that is necessary to allow coordination 
to take place between all of the access control decisions in a 
distributed system. The semantics of the coordination attributes 
are known to the coordination object but not to the PDPs, since 
the latter do not know the semantics of any of the attributes of the 
request context (environment, subject etc.). The PDPs only know 
that the request context attributes hold values that need to be 
compared with those in the access control policy to see if the 
access control conditions are fulfilled. 
The coordination object is considered to be persistent and stateful, 
in much the same way that the environment object stores the 
environmental attributes in a persistent way. In this way the PDPs 
remain stateless. A significant difference between the 
environmental and coordination attributes is that the access 
control process only needs to read the former, whereas it needs to 
read and update the latter. Furthermore, a coordination attribute is 
related to attributes of a subject, resource, action, or the 
environment, and can be indexed on any combination of those 
types of attributes. 
We specify a coordination attribute as follows: 
Att[SubDim, ResDim, ActDim, EnvDim](C) 
where Att is the name of a coordination attribute belonging to the 
coordination object C, and [SubDim, ResDim, ActDim, EnvDim] 
are optional multiple dimensions of the coordination attribute. 
SubDim, ResDim, ActDim and EnvDim denote the subject, 
resource, action and environment dimensions of the coordination 
attribute, respectively. Every attribute in SubDim (ResDim, 
ActDim or EnvDim), if any, come from the request context. 
Examples of coordination attributes are: usage(C) which means 
the coordination attribute called usage has a single value that is 
used by all subjects accessing all resources over all actions and 
environments; usage[{username(S)}](C) which means the 
coordination attribute called usage has a different value per 
subject, where each subject is identified by their username 
attribute.  
An example policy with a coordinated constraint is: users, 
identified by their userIDs, cannot use more than 3GB of storage 
each throughout the grid. This can be written as type(R)=storage 
∧type(A)=use∧amount(A) + alreadyUsed[{userID(S)}](C) ≤ 3.  
Most PDPs should now be capable of evaluating this type of 
policy, providing the request context contains the value of the 
alreadyUsed coordination attribute. The fact that the coordination 
attribute contains embedded encoding in the form of 
[{userID(S)}] should be transparent to the PDP, since the names 
of attributes have no semantic meaning to the PDP. All the PDP 
needs to do is compare the value of the coordination attribute 
presented in the request context with the corresponding value in a 
policy constraint. 
2.2 Obligations 
The next thing we need to ensure is that the coordination 
attributes are updated once/if the user has been given access to the 
resource. This is achieved by the use of appropriate obligations in 
the coordination policy. Obligations are actions placed on the PEP 
that have to be obeyed if/when the user is given the requested 
access to a resource. In the XACML standard [6] an obligation is 
defined as a set of attribute assignments, for example, assign 
balance[{id(S)}](C) + amount(A) to balance[{id(S)}](C). Since it 
is the PEP that enforces the grant or deny decisions of the PDP, 
and is responsible for enforcing all obligations, it seems 
appropriate that the PEP should also be the entity that updates the 
coordination object. In order to specify when the obligations 
should be enacted, we define the Chronicle parameter of an 
obligation. The Chronicle parameter can take one of three values: 
Before, After or With. Chronicle=After indicates that the 
obligation should be enacted only after the user’s access request 
has been enforced. Chronicle=Before indicates that the obligation 
should take place before the user’s request is enforced. 
Chronicle=With indicates that the obligation and the user’s 
request should be enforced as an atomic action. It is up to the 
coordination policy writer to determine which Chronicle value to 
use. Note that XACML does not have a Chronicle parameter, 
since it implicitly assumes the semantics of the With value. 
There are important implications in the use of the alternative 
Chronicle values. Chronicle=Before means that the coordination 
attribute will be updated before the user’s request is processed. 
Therefore if the user’s request subsequently fails for some 
unexpected reason e.g. the ATM machine jams and cannot 
dispense any money, the user may be prevented from performing 
the same action again at a later time. This is because the 
coordination attribute has already recorded the action prior to it 
taking place. Similarly Chronicle=After means that the user is 
allowed to perform his action before the coordination attributes 
are updated. If anything goes wrong with the subsequent 
coordination attribute update, the user’s action will not be 
recorded and the user may be allowed to perform the same request 
again, in contravention of the coordination policy. However 
Chronicle=After might be the option that some policy writers 
prefer e.g. banks might prefer ATM withdrawals to occasionally 
allow a customer to withdraw over his daily limit than to risk 
upsetting him by occasionally not allowing him to withdraw his 
daily limit. Chronicle=With does not suffer from either of the 
previous deficiencies, since the user’s request and the 
coordination attribute update are performed as an atomic action. 
However it does mean that transactions have to be enacted on the 
coordination database, and the coordination attributes have to be 
write locked for the duration of the user’s action. This may cause 
an unacceptable bottleneck to performance in many grid 
applications that can run for hours or even days. Therefore the 
policy writer has to choose the most appropriate Chronicle setting 
for his resources and the applications that use them. 
Further details about the coordination policy specification and its 
refinement can be found in [7]. 
3. THE COORDINATION DATABASE 
GRID SERVICE 
The coordination database is a grid service with a backend SQL 
database that provides access to the coordination attributes needed 
by the multiple PDPs.  The service supports seven methods, 
namely: 
- checkWS checks if the service is available or not, 
- getCoordAttrVal returns the value of a coordination 
attribute given its name and an XACML request context 
(that contains the values of the dimensional attributes that 
are embedded in the coordination attribute name). If no 
value currently exists for this element, then the service 
creates a new one and initializes it with the initial value 
known to the coordination object. 
- setCoordAttrVal similarly sets the value of a coordination 
attribute. 
- isCoordAttr queries if a coordination attribute of this name 
exists in the coordination database 
- getAttributeDefinition returns an XML element which 
contains the definition of the coordination attribute 
including the attributes that are embedded in its name 
- lockCoordAttrs allows multiple attributes in the database to 
be read or write locked 
- unlockCoordAttrs removes all the locks in the database held 
by the current thread. 
The structure of the backend SQL database is a series of tables, in 
which each table represents one coordination attribute. In every 
table there is one column for each subject, action, resource or 
environment attribute that is contained in the definition of that 
coordination attribute plus one column to hold the coordination 
attribute values. The general formula for the size of a table is 
(|SubDim|+|ResDim|+|ActDim|+|EnvDim|+1) x N 
where |XDim| represents the number of members in the set Dim 
and N represents the number of rows in the table. For example, 
the coordination attribute recording the number of user accesses 
in different modes to files in different filestores could be held as 
numberOfAccesses [{id(S)},{id(R)},{mode(A),fileName(A)}](C) 
and is represented as a table which consists of 5 columns. Every 
unique combination of user id, filestore id, mode of access and 
filename will create a new row in the table, with the final column 
recording the number of accesses for that user to that file in that 
access mode. Assume a subject (id = X) wants to access a file 
(mode = M, fileName = F) on a filestore (id = Y), then the current 
value of the numberOfAccesses may be located from this table by 
the following SQL command: SELECT value FROM 
numberOfAccesses WHERE id(S)=X AND id(R)=Y AND  
mode(A)=M AND fileName(A)=F. If no record can be located 
using these dimensional attribute values, this means that it is the 
first user access of this kind to this file, and a new row, consisting 
of these dimensional attribute values and an initial value for the 
numberOfAccesses should be inserted into the table. The initial 
value is part of the semantics of the coordination object and is 
part of the schema of the coordination database grid service.  
3.1 Securing Access to the Coordination 
Database Grid Service 
The coordination database grid service, being a standard grid 
service, is protected by GSI and its own PDP that ensures that 
only authorised coordination aware PDPs can access it. This is 
easily achieved by assigning a digitally signed X.509 attribute 
certificate with a role of “Coordinator” to the Coordinator 
component of the GT4 Custom PDP of Figure 3, and having a 
standard role based access control (RBAC) policy that says that 
only subjects with the role of “Coordinator” are allowed to access 
the coordination database. This allows any number of 
coordination aware PDPs to access the coordination database. 
Each Coordinator has its own public key certificate and DN so 
that it can strongly authenticate to the coordination database grid 
service. In our implementation the “Coordinator” attribute 
certificate is pulled from an LDAP repository by the service’s 
PDP (we use the PERMIS PDP that supports both the push and 
pull modes of attribute retrieval). 
4. THE COORDINATION AWARE PDP 
The GT4 authorisation framework implements a decision engine 
which evaluates a chain of PDPs in order to determine the access 
rights of the user making a request for a particular Grid service or 
resource (the Target in Figure 3). This authorisation chain may 
also include Policy Information Points (PIPs), which do not return 
any decisions but instead are used to collect information i.e., 
attributes or attribute assertions, necessary for the decision-
making process. Both PDPs and PIPs are classified by GT4 as 
interceptors. Globus Toolkit itself is the PEP that enforces the 
decisions made by the PDPs, and passes the information returned 
by the PIPs to the PDPs. PIPs are needed to pick up the attributes 
of the subject, the action, the resource and the environment. GT4 
requires that PDPs implement the 
org.globus.wsrf.security.authorization.PDP interface and return a 
permit or deny decision on the basis of the subject’s distinguished 
name (DN) obtained from the proxy certificate, the requested 
operation and the request context. PIPs must implement the 
org.globus.wsrf.security.authorization.PIP interface, and must 
place the set of retrieved subject, action, resource and 
environmental attributes in the request context. 
Ideally we would like GT4 to be modified in order to integrate 
our coordination aware authorization infrastructure directly into 
the PEP. However, if we did this it would cause integration 
problems for other users and long term support issues for us. 
Consequently we have adopted an interim approach of plugging 
our entire coordination infrastructure into GT4 as a single custom 
PDP. This has limitations as described in section 5, but still 
allows secure coordination to take place. In section 5 we describe 
how the coordination infrastructure could be more tightly 
integrated into GT to become an integrally supported feature. 
Figure 3. Adding coordination to GT4 
When GT4 is given a user’s request to access a grid service, our 
coordination aware PDP is called via the GT4 authorisation chain.  
Our java code (labelled Coordinator in Figure 3) is acting as a 
PDP from GT4’s perspective, and a PEP from the actual PDP’s 
perspective. The actual PDP is the one making authorisation 
decisions based on the coordinated access control policy. One of 
the first steps the Coordinator takes is to write lock and retrieve 
the required coordination attributes from the coordination 
database grid service, using its in-built coordination PIP.  
The obvious question to ask is, how does the Coordinator know 
which coordination attributes are needed, since the coordination 
database could contain many thousands of attributes. However, 
this question is not a new one, since even without coordination 
attributes the PEP still needs to know which other attributes 
(environmental, action etc) are needed by the PDP. There are (at 
least) three possible solutions to this problem. Firstly, the PEP can 
be configured in an application specific manner with the correct 
set of attributes that need to be passed to the PDP in each request 
context. Secondly, a getAttributes method can be added to the 
PDP which is called at initialisation time and returns the complete 
set of all attributes that are needed by the current authorisation 
policy. Thirdly, the authorisation decision request can return the 
set of additional attributes that are needed in order to answer the 
current authorisation decision request. This latter mechanism is 
the one adopted by XACML. Since the second mechanism is 
simply an automation of the first they will be treated as equivalent 
in the following discussion. Having the complete list of attributes 
at initialisation time will mean that the PDP only needs to be 
called once per authorisation decision, but will result in surplus 
information being passed in the request context. Not knowing the 
correct set of attributes to pass when the PDP is called will result 
in multiple calls to the PDP, and possibly to the coordination 
database, but no surplus information will be passed in the request 
context. The latter approach is expected to be most efficient when 
policies are large and different attributes are needed for different 
policy rules, whilst the former approach is expected to be most 
efficient for small policies that only require a limited number of 
attributes. We have currently implemented the second approach 
and have added a getAttributes method to the XACML and 
PERMIS PDPs. Future work will be to measure the performance 
trade offs between the two approaches. 
When the appropriate coordination attributes have been returned 
from the coordination database grid service, the Coordinator adds 
them to the request context obtained from the GT4 PEP, and 
passes this expanded context to the actual PDP. The coordination 
attributes are actually packaged as environmental ones. The PDP 
returns an authorisation decision, according to its evaluation of 
the user’s request against the coordinated access control policy.  If 
the PDP returns access granted the authorisation decision may 
contain obligations to update appropriate coordination attribute 
values. The Coordinator makes various calls to an obligations 
service (see below) which evaluates the obligations and updates 
the coordination database. The Coordinator then removes the 
locks on the database and returns the granted response to the GT4 
PEP (minus the obligations). The user is then allowed access to 
the service by GT4. The reader will note that this design only 
supports the Chronicle=Before option for obligations. In section 5 
we describe how the other Chronicle options can be implemented. 
The obligations service has 3 methods: 
- getChronicle. This method is given the authorisation 
decision response and returns the value of the Chronicle 
parameter, or an exception if the response does not contain 
any obligations. 
- evaluateObligation is passed the request context and 
authorisation response and evaluates the various attribute 
assignments in the obligation, including the arithmetic 
expressions such as addition, subtraction, multiplication etc. 
e.g. assign balance[{id(S)}](C) + amount(A) to 
balance[{id(S)}](C), and places the result in the response. 
- performObligation extracts the coordination attribute values 
from the response, and updates the coordination database by 
making repeated calls to setCoordAttrVal. 
We have currently only implemented a simple service as proof of 
concept, which simulates an ATM withdrawal. When the service 
is asked to dispense money it returns a receipt to the user. Without 
the coordination capability, a standard PDP can only have a 
policy constraint that limits each withdrawal to a particular value, 
say £250. If a user requests £250 or below the request will be 
granted by the PDP and the ATM service will return a receipt 
saying the money has been dispensed. If a user requests greater 
than £250 the PDP will deny access to the service. Of course, a 
user can make several consecutive requests for £250 or less and 
therefore withdraw an unlimited amount of money. Once the 
coordination aware PDP is configured into the grid service, a user 
can only withdraw up to £250 per day, and after that all his 
subsequent requests are denied. The system works regardless of 
how many different ATM services and PDPs are plugged into 
GT4, since all the PDPs coordinate their decisions via the same 
coordination DB service. 
5. LIMITATIONS, CONCLUSIONS AND 
FUTURE WORK 
As stated previously, the current implementation only implements 
the Chronicle=Before option, since the Coordinator has to update 
the coordination database before returning the granted response to 
the GT4 PEP. It might have been possible to implement the 
Chronicle=After option as well if we could have made GT4 make 
a second call out to our custom PDP after the user’s service has 
completed successfully, but we did not think that this extra effort 
was necessarily worthwhile. Our preferred solution is for the 
coordination infrastructure to be tightly integrated into GT by 
taking the various components of the Coordinator and integrating 
them into the GT PEP as follows. 
Figure 4. Integrating coordination into GT 
The Coordination PIP and Obligations Service, which are 
currently part of the Coordinator, will become stand alone 
services directly called by the GT PEP. In addition, the PEP will 
be responsible for setting the write locks on the coordination 
attributes in the coordination database. The GT PEP will need 
enhancing to repeatedly call the custom PIPs and the PDP, if the 
PDP returns a set of additional attributes that are needed before 
and authorization decision can be made (as in the XACML 
model). Once an authorization decision has been returned the PEP 
will need to call the obligations service to process the obligations 
and update the coordination database, and then remove the 
coordination database locks. 
In order to correctly handle the Chronicle parameter, the PEP 
needs to undertake enforcement of the user’s access request and 
updating of the coordination database in different sequences. 
Unfortunately the type of Chronicle is not known until after the 
authorization decision has been made, but locking the 
coordination database is needed before the decision is made, i.e. 
when the coordination values are first read by the coordination 
PIP. This leads us to define two different procedures for the PEP, 
which we term Lock All Decide Once and Multiple Decisions. 
The former procedure is used if the PEP is able to get the full set 
of attributes that are needed at initialization time, the latter if it is 
not (i.e. the XACML model). 
In Lock All Decide Once, the PEP obtains the full set of 
coordination and environmental attributes that are needed by the 
PDP in either an application specific manner or via a call to the 
PDP’s getAttributes method. After each user presents an access 
request, the PEP locks the coordination attributes in the 
coordination database and calls the custom PIPs (subject, action, 
resource, environment and coordination) to fetch the required 
attributes. The PEP creates the expanded request context and calls 
the PDP passing it the full set of attributes. An authorization 
decision and optional obligations are returned in the response 
context. The PEP calls the getChronicle method of the 
Obligations Service passing it the returned authorization response. 
If Chronicle=After is returned, the PEP removes the coordination 
attribute locks, enforces the user’s access request, and after this 
has finished updates the coordination database (through calls to 
Evaluate and Perform Obligations). If Chronicle=Before is 
returned, the PEP updates the coordination attributes first, then 
removes the locks and afterwards enforces the user’s access 
request. If Chronicle=With is returned, the PEP enforces the 
user’s access request and after this has finished, updates the 
coordination attributes and finally removes the locks. 
In the Multiple Decisions procedure the PEP does not call the 
environmental or coordination PIPs after the user has presented an 
access request, since it does not know which attributes are 
needed, but rather calls the PDP first. The PDP returns the set of 
environmental and coordination attributes that are needed for this 
access request, and the PEP locks the coordination attributes and 
calls the custom PIPs to retrieve the attributes. The PDP is now 
called for a second time, passing it the required environmental 
and coordination attributes. (Note that this process may need to be 
repeated again if the PDP returns further needed attributes instead 
of an authorization decision.) Once the authorization decision and 
optional obligations are returned the procedure continues in the 
same way as before in the Lock All Decide Once procedure. 
In conclusion, we have shown how coordination between access 
control decision making can be modeled and implemented in a 
grid environment. We have defined the necessary coordination 
attributes and obligations that are needed to support the model, 
including a Chronicle parameter that indicates when the 
coordination attributes have to be updated. We have implemented 
the Chronicle=Before procedure in GT4 by building a custom 
PDP. Finally, we have described how coordinated decision 
making can be more tightly integrated into GT so as to support 
the Chronicle=After and Chronicle=With variants as well. We are 
not aware of any other similar research, although grid accounting 
systems such as the SEGAS Bank service [8] address similar 
concerns. In this, the user’s access request is intercepted by the 
Job Account Reservation Manager (JARM) and an amount of 
units, sufficient to run the job, are placed on hold in the user’s 
account. If a user has insufficient funds his job will be rejected. 
JARM gains access to the user’s bank account by using the proxy 
certificate delegated to the job by the user. Once the user’s job 
has finished JARM debits the user’s account with the actual 
amount of units consumed. The Bank service keeps a complete 
transaction history of all accesses to a user’s account, and holds 
on units automatically expire after a user determined period to 
cater for jobs that crash prematurely. Future research should 
investigate integrating our authorization system with grid 
accounting systems. 
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